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 Ford v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 55 (Sept. 29, 2011)1  




 Appeal from a district court judgment of conviction, by way of a jury verdict, for 
pandering of prostitution. 
 
Disposition / Outcome 
 
The Supreme Court of Nevada held that NRS 201.300(1)(a) is not unconstitutionally 
overbroad because of its specific intent requirement. The statute is also not unconstitutionally 
overbroad because it punishes speech promoting criminal conduct, which is not protected by the 
First Amendment.  Further, the statute is not vague because it: (1) provides sufficient notice of 
prohibited conduct, and (2) provides law enforcement officers sufficient standards with which to 
act.  Finally, the Court found that NRS 201.300(1)(a) applies to undercover sting operations.  
However, the Court reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial because the district court 
failed to provide the jury with a specific intent instruction. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Jerome Ford (“Ford”) was convicted of pandering of prostitution. His conviction arose 
from a prostitution sting operation, which the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
conducted on the Las Vegas strip.  Leesa Fazal (“Fazal”), an undercover officer posing as a 
prostitute, was wearing a wire underneath her dress when Ford approached her. During their 
conversation, Ford elicited from Fazal that she was “working.” Thereafter, Ford explained the 
nature of his business and the services that he could provide Fazal, including protection, 
management, care, advice on collecting money from a “trick,” and instruction on recognizing an 
undercover officer.  After Fazal indicated that she did not employ the services of a pimp, Ford 
suggested that she should work with him, boasting that Fazal would realize a greater profit 
through his services. 
 
The State of Nevada charged Ford with pandering of prostitution and attempted 
pandering of prostitution.  During Ford’s trial, the jury did not receive an instruction on specific 
intent.  Instead, the jury received a general intent instruction, which contained the text of NRS 
201.300(1)(a) and enumerated the elements for general intent under NRS 193.190.  Additionally, 
the general intent instruction indicated that motive was not an element of the crime charged and 
that the State did not have to prove motive to convict.  Ford did not object to the failure to 
instruct the jury on specific intent.   
 
The jury returned a guilty verdict for Ford, and he was sentenced as a habitual criminal to 
five to twenty years in prison.  Ford appealed his conviction of pandering for prostitution, 
arguing that NRS 201.300(1)(a): (1) is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment, 
(2) is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
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(3) does not apply because the target, Fazal, was an undercover police officer for whom 




The Court began its analysis by construing the challenged statute.  NRS 201.300(1)(a) 
provides that “a person who: (a) Induces, persuades, encourages, inveigles, entices, or compels a 
person to become a prostitute or to continue to engage in prostitution… is guilty of pandering.”2  
While “prostitute” and “prostitution” are statutorily defined terms, the verbs “induces, persuades, 
encourages, inveigles, entices, or compels” are without definition.  Moreover, unlike most 
modern criminal statutes, NRS 201.300(1)(a) does not designate a mens rea, or bad-mind, 
requirement.   
 
 Given the absence of an express mens rea requirement, Ford asserted that the statute 
imposed strict liability, based on cause and effect rather than intent.  The Court disagreed, 
finding that  NRS 201.300(1)(a) requires a defendant to act with the specific intent of inducing, 
persuading, encouraging, inveigling, enticing, or compelling his target to take up, or continue to 
engage in, prostitution.  Thereafter, the Court delineated five factors influencing its conclusion. 
 
First, the Court found that the mere absence of an express intent requirement does not 
automatically indicate that a statute imposes strict liability.  While strict liability offenses do 
exist in the criminal law and do not inevitably violate constitutional requirements, such offenses 
nevertheless receive a disfavored status.3  As such, courts require more than mere omission of a 
mens rea requirement from the statutory definition to construe a statute as imposing strict 
liability.4   
 
Second, the Court determined that the history and apparent purpose of NRS 
201.300(1)(a) support construing the statute to require a defendant to act with the specific intent 
of encouraging the target to become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution.  NRS 
201.300(1)(a) closely mirrors the Mann Act, which did not focus on whether prostitution actually 
occurred, but rather, whether the defendant intended to prostitute the target.5  Similarly, Nevada 
case law recognizes that NRS 201.300(1)(a) concentrates on whether the defendant sought to 
recruit a target into the practice of prostitution, not whether prostitution actually occurred.6  
Thus, the law distinguishes between a pimp who solicits business for a prostitute, and a panderer 
who recruits a target for prostitution.7  In contrast to the pimp/prostitute relationship, the 
panderer’s target is not considered a co-conspirator, but rather, the victim of a crime. 
 
 The Court also argued that if it were to construe NRS 201.300(1)(a) as imposing strict 
liability, the effect would be to shift the statute’s “focus from the panderer’s efforts to recruit 
                                                 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.300(1)(a) (2007). 
3 E.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1978); Morissette v. United States, 342 
U.S. 246, 263 (1952).    
4  See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994). 
5  The Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (1910); E.g. United States v. Rashkovski, 301 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002).    
6  Stanifer v. State, 109 Nev. 304, 308, 849 P.2d 282, 285 (1993). 
7  Id. 
prostitutes to the success of the recruiting program.”8  As such, liability would stem from 
whether the target engaged in prostitution, regardless of the panderer’s intent.  
 
 NRS 175.301 was a further influence on the Court’s analysis of the history and purpose 
of NRS 201.300(1)(a). NRS 175.301 required corroboration of a target’s testimony during a 
“trial for… inveigling, enticing or taking away any [person] for the purpose of prostitution.”9  
The Court reasoned that the Legislature’s inclusion of the “for the purpose of” language in the 
NRS 201.300(1)(a)’s companion statute confirmed the reasonableness of construing NRS 
201.300(1)(a) as requiring specific intent. 
 
Third, the Court determined that there are no grammatical barriers to reading a specific 
intent requirement into NRS 201.300(1)(a). Furthermore, the statutory language supports such an 
interpretation.  The Court noted that even in the absence of an adverb or phrase indicating fault, 
fault may be inherent in the verbs within the statute.   
 
Fourth, the Court noted that throughout the country, the statutory formulations of 
pandering laws vary; however, no decision interpreting a pandering statute applies anything 
other than a specific intent requirement.  For example, in a recent decision, the California 
Supreme Court held that “pandering is a specific intent crime.”10 
 
Finally, the Court noted that courts are careful to avoid construing a statute to impose 
strict liability where the absence of an intent requirement would encompass a broad range of 
innocuous conduct.11  Such a broad sweep would criminalize innocent conduct, while rendering 
the statute vulnerable to constitutional challenges under the Due Process Clause and the First 




 The Court acknowledged that Ford was correct in his argument that NRS 201.300(1)(a) 
permits conviction based on speech.  However, while the First Amendment provides broad 
protection for speech, such protection is not unlimited.12  In fact, criminal prohibitions of speech 
intended to encourage or instigate illegal activities are well-rooted in the legal system.13  Such 
speech is not afforded First Amendment Protection because it promotes criminal conduct.14 
 
 According to the Court, pandering is a variety of criminal solicitation, and statutes 
prohibiting solicitation punish a type of speech: “asking another to commit a crime.”15  Such 
prohibition is narrowed to illegal employment offers in the case of pandering, which prohibits 
encouraging another to become, or remain, a prostitute.  Moreover, where prostitution is illegal, 
as in Nevada, the First Amendment does not protect pandering.  
                                                 
8  Ford v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 55, at 11 (Sept. 1, 2011). 
9  NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.301 (repealed 2005). 
10  People v. Zambia, 254 P.3d 965, 974 (Cal. 2011). 
11  Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994). 
12  United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956, 960 (7th Cir. 2010). 
13  United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008). 
14  Id. 
15  White, 610 F.3d at 960. 
 
In addition, Ford asserted that NRS 201.300(1)(a) permits conviction of individuals who 
did not act with the requisite specific intent.  However, the Court determined that such issues do 
not establish overbreadth, but rather, are examples of the inferences that jurors can draw from the 
facts.  The Court also concluded that NRS 201.300(1)(a) does not prohibit the advocacy of 
prostitution in the abstract because it requires the specific intent of encouraging a target to 




 Ford asserted two vagueness arguments: (1) pursuant to Silvar v. District Court,16 NRS 
201.300(1)(a) is unconstitutionally indeterminate because conviction depends on the effect of a 
defendant’s conduct upon the target, and (2) the statute violates the due process principles 
enunciated in Flamingo Paradise Gaming  v. Attorney General,17 by failing to define its 
operative verbs.  The Court disagreed, holding that NRS 201.300(1)(a), due to its requirement of 
specific intent, is distinguishable from the statutes considered in Silvar and Flamingo Paradise 
Gaming.   
 
 In Silvar, the Court considered a county ordinance that prohibited  loitering “in a manner 
and under circumstances manifesting the purpose of inducing, enticing, soliciting for or 
procuring another to commit an act of prostitution.”18  In construing the statute, the Court 
determined that the statute’s prohibition was triggered by a hypothetical viewer’s interpretation 
of a defendant’s loitering rather than the defendant’s subjective intent.   
 
     Unlike the city ordinance in Silvar, NRS 201.300(1)(a) requires that the defendant 
actually intends for his target to engage in prostitution.  Under NRS 201.300(1)(a), conviction 
does not turn on a subjective determination regarding the defendant’s conduct, but rather, entails 
a question of fact – whether the defendant acted with the requisite intent. Additionally, the Court 
determined that the omission of a definition for the operative verbs in NRS 201.300(1)(a) does 
not render the statute void for vagueness.  While the words induces, persuades, encourages, 
inveigles, entices, or compels are not defined in the statute, they are all words with common 
dictionary definitions.    
   
Statutory Analysis 
 
 Ford also asserted two statutory arguments.  First, Ford argued that NRS 201.300(1)(a) 
did not apply in his situation, regardless of his intent, because Fazal testified that she did not 
intend to become a prostitute, nor to continue to engage in prostitution.  Alternatively, Ford 
suggested that, at most, the State could charge him with attempted pandering. 
 
The Court noted that in focusing on the victim’s intent, Ford conflated pandering of 
prostitution, an inchoate crime requiring specific intent, with the crime of prostitution. NRS 
                                                 
16 Silvar v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 129 P.3d 682 (2006). 
17 Flamingo Paradise Gaming v. Attorney Gen., 125 Nev. 502, 514, 217 P.3d 546, 554-55 (2009). 
18  Silvar, 122 Nev. at 289, 129 P.3d at 682 (2006) (citing CLARK CNTY. ORDINANCE § 10.08.030 (2006). 
201.300(1)(a) looks to the defendant’s intent, not the victim’s.19  The Court also recognized that 
the crime of pandering is complete upon some uttering of encouragement for the target to 
become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution.   
 
Additionally, the Court found that NRS 175.301, the statute requiring corroboration of a 
witness’s testimony to convict a defendant of pandering, demonstrates that NRS 201.300(1)(a) 
applies to undercover sting operations.  After the Court reversed a pandering conviction on the 
ground that a police officer could not corroborate a fellow officer’s testimony, the Legislature 
amended NRS 175.301(2) to exclude from the corroboration requirement witnesses who were 
on-duty police officers at the relevant time.20  Notwithstanding repeal of NRS 175.301’s 
corroboration requirement in 2005, the statute’s provision excluding an undercover police 
officer’s testimony from the corroboration requirement demonstrated the  Legislature’s intent for 
NRS 175.301 to apply to undercover sting operations. 
 
As to Ford’s attempted pandering argument, the Court looked to People v. Zambia,21 a 
California Supreme Court decision involving similar facts.  There, the Court held that “the crime 
of pandering is complete when the defendant ‘encourages another person to become a 
prostitute.” 22Further, the fact that Ford mistakenly believed Fazal to be a prostitute is not 
sufficient to overcome conviction under NRS 201.300(1)(a).  In determining a defendant’s 
culpability for a solicitation-type crime, courts look to the facts as the defendant believed them to 
be.23  Finally, the Court noted that a defendant could be convicted of attempted pandering if he 





NRS 201.300(1)(a) is not unconstitutionally overbroad because it requires a specific 
intent of inducing, persuading, encouraging, inveigling, enticing, or compelling a target to take 
up, or continue to engage in, prostitution.  Additionally, NRS 201.300(1)(a) is not 
unconstitutionally vague, as the statue provides both notice of the prohibited conduct and 
sufficient standards to guide the actions of law enforcement officers.  Finally, NRS 201.300(1)(a) 
applies to undercover sting operations.   
                                                 
19  United States v. Rashkovski, 301 F.3d 1133, 1137 (2002) (applying the Mann Act). 
20  Sheriff v. Jilliard, 96 Nev. 345, 608 P.2d 1111 (1980) 
21  People v. Zambia, 254 P.3d 965 (Cal. 2011). 
22 Id. at 975 n. 8.   
23  United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 300 (2008). 
